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## Experimental Research

*Semiotics is the scientific behavior and critical wisdom of  
an observer of the subjects of allied sciences.*  
—Umberto Eco

*The chapter introduces a new version of semantic analysis, which was applied to political psychology, marketing, advertising, ethnopsychology, and psychoendocrinology. Only the study of a political leader's image in student predispositions is included in this chapter as an example. The elaborated method estimates the following aspects of student ratings: Stable and noise-related semantic components, semantic coordinates and intensity and rigidity (stability), interpretations of a political image in relation to a predefined mentality, the degree of polarization, the degree of proximity of specific politicians to the ideal prototype of a political image for a given mentality.*

The chapter presents some applied experimental studies from the most varied fields: political psychology, marketing, advertising, ethnopsychology and psychoendocrinology. The first four studies were done in the paradigm of the semantic analysis set forth earlier and demonstrate some capabilities of the semiotic approach. These studies are based on the latest practices in the development of the method of semantic analysis, using specially designed software. The study in psychoendocrinology was the earliest of the projects. It was done in the paradigm of “classical” psycho-semantics and deals with the biological determinants of asocial behavior.

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Translated by Steven Shabad.

The studies were chosen with a view to allowing the reader to gain an understanding of the proposed techniques based on practical examples and to compare the different approaches. Unfortunately, it is not possible within the scope of this book to demonstrate the entire spectrum of capabilities of these techniques. A fuller (updatable) version of the experimental studies is presented at [www.sny-research.com](http://www.sny-research.com).<sup>1</sup> In addition, in selecting material for this chapter, we sought to make the results of the studies interesting in themselves for specialists.

### **Semantic analysis in political research**

The subject of this project<sup>2</sup> consists of new methodological approaches to the diagnostics of political predispositions and the forecasting of political approval ratings in various social groups.

A new methodology and procedure for studying and measuring political predispositions makes it possible, based on mathematical modeling of the semantic space of the perception of a politician's image (at the level of unconscious dispositions), to calculate the real reasons for the political preferences of electoral groups and their influence on political ratings:

The new research paradigm for forecasting political ratings:

- determines the stable and noise-related semantic components of ratings;
- models the estimate of political ratings in semantic coordinates with reference not only to its intensity but also to rigidity (stability);
- calculates probabilistic models of interpretations of a political image for a predefined mentality;
- determines the degree of polarization of public opinion with respect to specific political leaders;
- constructs motivational vectors of a politician's ideal image for various mentalities according to predefined conditions; and
- tests the degree of proximity of specific politicians to the ideal prototype of a political image for a given mentality.

At the software level, finishing touches have been put on a technology of molding and adjusting a stable image for a candidate and controlling it during an advertising campaign (including a model for testing political advertising). Under this methodology, a substantive assessment was conducted of the meanings of political choice in Russia based on a study of the motivational profile of approval ratings of the most recognized Russian and foreign politicians in the Russian mentality based on a regional sampling. The methodology is based on advanced theories in the field of cognitive psychology using mathematical modeling methods that involve intensive computer use and make it possible to quickly obtain accurate information from relatively small samples.

The results of the project's research were published in the journals *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* (Moscow, 1999), *Marketing i marketingovye issledovaniia*

*v Rossii* (Moscow, 1999), *Obrazovanie i sotsial'noe razvitie regiona* (Barnaul, 2000), *Aktual'nye voprosy sotsiologii i psikhologii* (Barnaul, 2000), and others. The results were presented in papers at international and regional conferences and summer schools, and several graduation projects were completed.

This article offers specific extracts from the project that illustrate the most effective capabilities of the methodological designs in the context of the methodology and method of semantic analysis and their application as psychotechnologies in political marketing.

An analytical survey of some results of the study of young people's political predispositions toward the structure of the political image of a national leader<sup>3</sup> is more like a training-oriented demonstration version of the procedure of semantic analysis as applied to advanced political research strategies and is not intended to be a full-scale, substantive analysis of the problem.

### **A political leader's image in student predispositions**

The importance of a political leader is in large part defined by the amount of his political capital and his image. It is the political image that enables him to acquire, accumulate, and build up political capital, and hence to secure the voter's trust and support.

As is well known, a voter's decision on the choice of a politician is based not on rational arguments and a critical analysis of slogans and programs, not on a detailed study of the candidates' biographies and their personal qualities but on an intuitive set of external impressions of politicians—a manufactured image.


A politician's image is a conception that takes shape among the population regarding a politician as a result of prolonged external exposure that is highly stable and resistant to change. Technologically, the creation of an image boils down to the molding or adjustment of certain stereotypes of perception of a political leader in the mass consciousness.

In this process, one constantly has to deal with the following questions: To what extent does the candidate's image fit the ideal picture in the voter's "head?" How does the prototype of a politician take shape in the mass consciousness and what does it depend on? Why do voters prefer one type of politician or another? Why does the structure of political preferences change as conditions change? All this depends on a whole variety of factors of political evaluation: mentality, social experience, the current sociopolitical situation, political advertising, and successful "game-playing" in the political arena.

Obviously, accurate ratings-oriented and strategic forecasts are impossible to make without knowing the criteria that affect the choice of a certain image at a certain time. The specific aspects of social perception are determined in large part by the observer's position, which dictates various modes of perception and hence the possible models of interpretation.

In this sense, the models of interpretation of a politician's image constitute

**Figure 1. Average Probabilities of Various Independent Versions of Semantic Assessments of Politicians' Roles**



independent views of politicians within the framework of the mentality under study. The study of the psychological and role-oriented models of interpretations of political image that are most probable and significant for forecasting political ratings is the subject of this work.

*Object of the study:* a politician's image in students' predispositions.

*Subject of the study:* models of interpretation of personality- and role-oriented aspects of the organization of the structure of a political image in student predispositions.

*Purpose of the study:* a quantitative and qualitative analysis of possible interpretations of a politician's image for forecasting political ratings under various conditions of political choice.

The principal tasks boiled down to identifying the most probable personality- and role-oriented models of a politician's image that affect ratings at a time of threat, stability, and the current situation; seeking a prototype of the ideal political leader for each situation; an assessment of the degree of proximity to the "ideal" of various politicians in each situation and a demonstration of an experimental model of analysis in the case of specific political leaders.

The hypotheses of the study state that there exist different models of a political image that work with different probabilities in different situations of political choice and dictate different ideals of a politician in these situations. The modeling of an image as the superposition of such ideals makes it possible to mold a political image that is optimal for the given mentality with minimal effort.


### **The semantic study of predispositions in perceiving role-oriented characteristics of a political image**

The research was conducted in the spring of 2002 (the mentality segment consisted of young people: men and women, eighteen to twenty-seven years old).

The average probabilities of various independent versions of semantic assessments of the roles of politicians (the states of subjects of the study) by young people's mentality are shown in Figure 1.

It is clear from the figure that the first three interpretations (states) are the most

Figure 2. Average Values of Contributions of States to Determination of the Subject of the Study



probable. However, their contribution to the average conception of a politician may vary, since each conception has both its own supporters and its own opponents, and their ratio in each case may be different. Consequently, in a number of cases, notwithstanding the stereotype of the perception of a politician’s role that is very widespread in society, the number of respondents who give directly opposing views regarding a specific politician may be virtually equal, and then the average view is determined not by the most probable predisposition and not by the largest mentality segment. This is a common situation when society is highly polarized regarding ways of solving a number of social problems that are associated with specific individuals. It is clear from Figure 2 that the first interpretation is determinative for the majority of politicians.<sup>4</sup>

However, with respect to little-known politicians or those toward whom public opinion is highly polarized, states with even low probability may prove to be significant (see Table 1).

We define independent states as noncorrelating interpretations that have two opposite poles. In analyzing Table 1, it is not hard to identify the politicians toward whom the attitude in society is quite polarized and ambivalent: Clinton, Yeltsin, Chubais, Bush, Bin Laden.

The study used the following role labels of everyday consciousness: “hero,” “demagogue,” “gentleman,” “diplomat,” “clown,” “clever operator,” “actor,” “reformer,” “extremist,” “gambler,” “orator,” “scammer,” “communist,” “martinet,” “smart fellow,” “fanatic,” “thinker,” “boss,” “tsar,” “bureaucrat,” “expert,” and “fighter.” Depending on the array of roles and the number of categories considered that undergo “varimax rotation,” one can identify various latent predispositions of mentality that are hidden in the structure of correlative connections between specific role descriptors in the given class of politicians. We tried to find the simplest lexical structure that has a fairly high forecasting value. Obviously, all structures that have identical predictive capability are equivalent and provide different semantic interpretations of a specific situation that are of equal weight with respect to the given mentality.

Let us consider one version of a categorical conception of politicians (see Table 2).

The first category (G1) reflects a predisposition to have a serious attitude toward the politician as a social leader and may be described as the “trust factor.” It consists of the following descriptors (the factor weights are shown in parentheses): “not a scammer”

Table 1

**Contribution of Different Independent Interpretations (d) to Average Conception Regarding a Politician in Young People's Mentality**

| Politicians         | d1   | d2   | d3    | d4    | d5    | d6    | d7    | d8    | d9    | d10   |
|---------------------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Peter the Great     | 0.96 | 0.03 | -0.21 | 0.07  | 0.06  | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0.11  | -0.04 | -0.02 |
| Lenin               | 0.96 | 0.03 | 0.14  | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.13 | 0.15  | -0.05 | 0.02  | 0.01  |
| Stalin              | 0.94 | 0.02 | 0.21  | -0.14 | 0.09  | 0.10  | -0.05 | 0.01  | -0.08 | 0.08  |
| Hitler              | 0.82 | 0.25 | -0.20 | 0.32  | 0.2   | -0.10 | 0.22  | 0     | 0.12  | 0.01  |
| <i>Clinton</i>      | 0.54 | 0.51 | -0.43 | 0.01  | 0.38  | 0.2   | -0.13 | 0.16  | 0.12  | -0.12 |
| Thatcher            | 0.87 | 0.39 | 0.19  | 0.01  | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.15  | 0.11  | -0.04 | 0.09  |
| Gorbachev           | 0.79 | 0.43 | -0.01 | -0.15 | 0.21  | -0.27 | 0.12  | -0.04 | -0.01 | -0.05 |
| Yeltsin             | 0.52 | 0.25 | 0.65  | 0.37  | -0.23 | -0.03 | -0.12 | -0.07 | 0.18  | -0.05 |
| Zyuganov            | 0.90 | 0    | 0.34  | -0.08 | 0.25  | 0.07  | 0.03  | 0.03  | 0.04  | -0.05 |
| Yavlinsky           | 0.92 | 0.23 | 0.23  | -0.13 | -0.09 | -0.06 | 0.08  | 0.10  | 0.02  | 0.02  |
| <i>Zhirinovskiy</i> | 0.89 | 0.45 | 0.05  | 0.04  | 0.07  | 0     | -0.01 | 0.04  | 0.02  | 0.03  |
| <i>Chubais</i>      | 0.01 | 0.58 | -0.04 | 0.73  | -0.27 | -0.11 | 0     | -0.02 | 0.15  | 0.03  |
| Luzhkov             | 0.93 | 0.06 | 0.17  | 0.18  | 0.01  | 0.06  | 0.03  | 0.02  | -0.15 | -0.04 |

|                  |             |             |             |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <i>Bush Jr.</i>  | <i>0.74</i> | <i>0.48</i> | <i>0.36</i> | 0.07  | 0.05  | 0.08  | -0.11 | 0.11  | -0.04 | 0.20  |
| Khakamada        | <i>0.99</i> | -0.05       | 0.05        | 0.02  | 0     | 0.05  | 0.03  | -0.05 | 0.02  | 0.01  |
| Putin            | <i>0.92</i> | 0.17        | <i>0.32</i> | 0.08  | -0.04 | 0.04  | 0.01  | 0.02  | 0.07  | 0.09  |
| Kasyanov         | <i>0.98</i> | -0.01       | 0.04        | 0.08  | -0.09 | 0.11  | 0.05  | 0.04  | 0.07  | 0.03  |
| Ryzhkov          | <i>0.96</i> | -0.06       | -0.12       | -0.10 | 0.07  | 0.10  | 0.11  | 0.05  | -0.04 | -0.08 |
| Berezovsky       | <i>0.95</i> | 0.18        | 0.09        | 0.05  | 0.13  | -0.01 | 0.15  | 0.01  | -0.02 | 0.01  |
| Shevardnadze     | <i>0.97</i> | 0.03        | -0.06       | 0.11  | -0.06 | 0.05  | 0.17  | -0.06 | 0.08  | 0.04  |
| Lukashenko       | <i>0.87</i> | <i>0.34</i> | -0.21       | -0.17 | 0.12  | -0.06 | 0.08  | 0.04  | 0.01  | -0.08 |
| Lebed            | 0.98        | 0.04        | 0.04        | 0     | -0.06 | 0.13  | -0.01 | -0.06 | 0.07  | -0.02 |
| Maskhadov        | <i>0.98</i> | -0.01       | -0.09       | -0.10 | 0.05  | 0.06  | 0.08  | -0.01 | 0.01  | 0.02  |
| Nemtsov          | <i>0.98</i> | -0.12       | 0.06        | -0.05 | 0.05  | 0     | 0.06  | 0.03  | -0.02 | -0.03 |
| Yasir Arafat     | <i>0.93</i> | 0.26        | 0.19        | -0.02 | 0.1   | 0.03  | 0.05  | 0.12  | -0.05 | -0.03 |
| <i>Bin Laden</i> | <i>0.77</i> | <i>0.52</i> | -0.29       | -0.04 | -0.15 | 0.14  | 0     | 0.07  | -0.08 | -0.05 |

*Note:* Significant contributions are in italics.

Table 2

**Categorical Predispositions of Young People's Mentality Regarding Political Roles**

| Roles                           | G1    | G2    | G3    | G4    | G5    |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Hero                            | 0.19  | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0.75  | 0.06  |
| Demagogue                       | -0.60 | -0.22 | 0.51  | 0.28  | -0.14 |
| Diplomat                        | 0.15  | -0.01 | -0.05 | 0.62  | 0.3   |
| Clown                           | -0.66 | -0.04 | 0.13  | -0.4  | -0.27 |
| Clever operator                 | -0.33 | 0.27  | 0.21  | 0.77  | 0.07  |
| Actor                           | -0.63 | 0.27  | 0.09  | -0.04 | -0.24 |
| Reformer                        | -0.17 | 0.2   | -0.15 | 0.17  | 0.84  |
| Extremist                       | 0.02  | 0.78  | -0.12 | -0.10 | 0.13  |
| Gambler                         | -0.57 | 0.61  | -0.22 | 0.21  | -0.01 |
| Orator                          | -0.20 | 0.34  | 0.72  | 0.10  | -0.05 |
| Scammer                         | -0.77 | -0.05 | 0.09  | -0.27 | -0.19 |
| Communist                       | -0.04 | -0.11 | 0.86  | -0.09 | 0.12  |
| Fanatic                         | -0.22 | 0.78  | 0.22  | 0.07  | -0.06 |
| Boss                            | 0.31  | 0.18  | 0.10  | 0.54  | 0.45  |
| Tsar                            | 0.26  | -0.02 | 0.20  | 0.19  | 0.86  |
| Expert                          | 0.25  | 0.36  | 0.36  | 0.34  | 0.44  |
| Fighter                         | 0.30  | 0.78  | 0.16  | 0.26  | 0.33  |
| <i>Significance of category</i> | 2.71  | 2.73  | 1.95  | 2.48  | 2.26  |

(0.77), "not a clown" (0.66), "not an actor" (0.63), and "not a gambler" (0.57).

The second category (G2) defines an "extremist-fanatic": "extremist" (0.78), "fanatic" (0.78), and "fighter" (0.78).

The third category (G3) reflects the role-oriented perception of a communist politician by the mentality of young people: "communist" (0.86), "orator" (0.72), and "demagogue" (0.51). It should be noted that in this mentality one can "split" the perception of *communist* into two components: "communist-orator-thinker" and "communist-demagogue-reformer-scammer" (this semantic link also contains an attitude toward current reforms). It is also possible to separate out this semantic combination: "communist-not expert-demagogue-tsar." We tried to select interpretations that have the greatest probability in this mentality, although an analysis of different significant mental interpretations may prove very helpful in terms of studying public predispositions and planning political advertising.

The fourth category (G4), in effect, characterizes a top crisis manager (crisis leader) in business: "clever operator" (0.77), "hero" (0.75), and "boss" (0.54)

The fifth category (G5) is the image of a successful reformer: "tsar" (0.86),

“reformer” (0.84), and “boss” (0.45). Presumably, even young people associate reforms with “absolutism” and do not believe in any other kind.

A categorical description of the first, most probable interpretation of politicians is shown in Table 3 and Figure 3 (significant semantic values are in italics).

Vladimir Putin is perceived so far as a crisis leader who can be trusted, and his image is closest to that of Margaret Thatcher. We should note that Maskhadov, Bin Laden, and Arafat were not perceived as extremists before September 2001, and while Maskhadov is not identified with a leader, he earns trust. Based on the relevant tables it is not hard to gain an impression of the most common views on any politician.

Let us take a more detailed look at the characteristics of the first state (see Table 4).

We now look at the most ambivalently perceived leaders.

We analyze the characteristics of the first state (perception) with respect to A. Chubais. The first predisposition for perception (“not an extremist” [0.30] and “not a crisis leader” [0.48]; see Table 3) is the most common ( $q = 0.18$ ), but the probabilities of a direct and opposite opinion (“crisis leader, extremist”) are the same ( $q^{(+)} = q^{(-)} = 0.09$ ). As a result of this polarization of public opinion, the overall stability of the average version of this image is extremely low ( $M = 0.02$ ), although the stability of the evaluation among adherents and opponents of this interpretation is average ( $b^{(+)} = 1.91$  and  $b^{(-)} = 1.79$ ).

Gorbachev, Bush Jr., and especially Yeltsin also have a less stable image in this state due to the intense polarization of mental evaluations.

With respect to Zhirinovskiy the state of *distrust* ( $-0.51$ ) is actualized in the mentality with a probability of  $q = 0.30$ : “actor,” “clown,” “gambler,” “scammer” (see Tables 3 and 2). The stability of this interpretation  $M = 1.53$ , however, among those who hold the opposite view (in the segment examined it is extremely small,  $q^{(-)} < 0.005$ ) is  $-18.42$ . This allows us to refer to them as “fanatics” and to Zhirinovskiy as a cult leader for them. A similar situation pertains to Stalin and Thatcher. With respect to Ryzhkov there is a clear “regional” and “age-related” artifact, since he is a young representative of Altai krai, where this study was conducted. Similarly, the age factor defined the admirers of Nemtsov, who are very few in number yet ardent. With regard to a role-oriented interpretation of the other politicians the situation in the first state is quite straightforward.

Evidently there exist critical values  $b^{(-)}$ ,  $q^{(-)}$  and their products, reflecting the aggregate intensity of the social position of marginal groups, such that when they are exceeded one should expect the emergence of extremist organizations and activities in society. One can assume that with the rise in the level of technologies in society, this threshold continually drops, and even a small group of outcast-fanatics is capable of pitting its interests against the interests of the less accentuated majority. Considering the high rigidity of their predispositions compared with the norm, it is to be expected that no counterpropaganda work with them will be effective. Obviously, the hard-line resistance to extremists makes them consolidate themselves and go “underground.” The milder resistance to the opposition at least makes it possible to wage an open war “according to the rules.”


Table 3

**A Categorical Interpretation of the First Mental Predisposition of the Perception of Politicians**

| Politicians     | Categories |           |           |               |          |
|-----------------|------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|----------|
|                 | Trust      | Extremist | Communist | Crisis leader | Reformer |
| Peter the Great | 0.06       | 0.19      | 0.06      | 0.66          | 0.61     |
| Lenin           | -0.25      | 0.38      | 0.58      | 0.4           | 0.32     |
| Stalin          | 0.22       | 0.44      | 0.11      | 0.34          | 0.42     |
| Hitler          | 0.11       | 0.53      | 0.29      | 0.08          | 0.43     |
| Clinton         | -0.71      | 0.02      | 0.09      | -0.19         | 0.20     |
| Thatcher        | 0.43       | 0.2       | -0.05     | 0.59          | 0.31     |
| Gorbachev       | -0.72      | -0.17     | 0.34      | 0             | 0.10     |
| Yeltsin         | -0.73      | -0.19     | 0.26      | 0.05          | 0.08     |
| Zyuganov        | 0          | -0.27     | 0.02      | -0.26         | -0.69    |
| Yavlinsky       | -0.11      | -0.35     | 0.05      | 0.03          | -0.69    |
| Zhirinovskiy    | -0.51      | 0.04      | 0.11      | -0.23         | -0.21    |
| Chubais         | 0.06       | -0.3      | -0.24     | -0.48         | -0.18    |
| Luzhkov         | 0.13       | -0.31     | -0.25     | -0.29         | -0.42    |
| Bush Jr.        | -0.13      | -0.54     | -0.25     | -0.28         | -0.59    |
| Khakamada       | 0.26       | -0.39     | -0.34     | -0.25         | -0.46    |
| Putin           | 0.49       | -0.02     | -0.11     | 0.48          | 0.15     |
| Kasyanov        | 0.51       | -0.40     | -0.27     | -0.08         | -0.28    |
| Ryzhkov         | 0.11       | -0.5      | -0.21     | -0.22         | -0.49    |
| Berezovsky      | -0.48      | -0.03     | -0.36     | -0.14         | 0.03     |
| Shevardnadze    | 0.29       | -0.14     | -0.42     | -0.47         | -0.33    |
| Lukashenko      | 0          | -0.15     | -0.14     | -0.56         | -0.22    |
| Lebed           | 0.77       | -0.16     | -0.34     | 0.01          | -0.04    |
| Maskhadov       | 0.30       | -0.07     | -0.58     | -0.31         | -0.41    |
| Nemtsov         | 0.16       | -0.45     | -0.33     | -0.26         | -0.47    |
| Yasir Arafat    | 0.43       | 0.08      | -0.37     | -0.12         | -0.14    |
| Bin Laden       | 0.04       | 0.21      | -0.48     | -0.06         | -0.53    |

Tables 5 and 6 show social predispositions for the perception of politicians, averaged out across mental states, and their characteristics. One can see that the probability of encountering such an interpretation in this mentality does not exceed the probability of the first state, and the levels of these evaluations are greatly moderated and watered down. In theory, a situation is possible in which the probability of encountering an average interpretation is equal to zero. In this case

Figure 3. A Categorical Interpretation of the First State of Politicians



[Labels in graph read as follows (left to right):]

- Peter the Great, Lenin,
- Stalin, Hitler, Clinton,
- Thatcher, Gorbachev,
- Yeltsin, Zyuganov,
- Yavlinsky, Zhirinovsky,
- Chubais, Luzhkov,
- Bush Jr., Khakamada,
- Putin, Kasyanov,
- Ryzhkov, Berezovsky,
- Shevardnadze,
- Lukashenko, Lebed,
- Maskhadov, Nemtsov,
- Yasir Arafat
- Bin Laden

Table 4

**Characteristics of the First Mental Predisposition of the Perception of Politicians**

| Politicians     | $q$  | $q^+$ | $q^-$  | $M$  | $b$  | $b^+$ | $b^-$  |
|-----------------|------|-------|--------|------|------|-------|--------|
| Peter the Great | 0.23 | 0.23  | >0.005 | 2.05 | 1.88 | 1.88  | >0.005 |
| Lenin           | 0.20 | 0.20  | >0.005 | 2.09 | 1.94 | 2.00  | -3.85  |
| Stalin          | 0.19 | 0.19  | >0.005 | 1.93 | 1.83 | 1.84  | -30.32 |
| Hitler          | 0.19 | 0.17  | 0.030  | 1.51 | 1.46 | 1.93  | -1.62  |
| Clinton         | 0.16 | 0.13  | 0.030  | 0.9  | 0.88 | 1.6   | -2.36  |
| Thatcher        | 0.16 | 0.15  | >0.01  | 1.86 | 1.78 | 1.85  | -15.68 |
| Gorbachev       | 0.16 | 0.14  | 0.020  | 1.39 | 1.36 | 1.89  | -2.79  |
| Yeltsin         | 0.19 | 0.14  | 0.050  | 0.88 | 0.85 | 1.84  | -1.68  |
| Zyuganov        | 0.18 | 0.18  | >0.005 | 1.91 | 1.80 | 1.89  | -4.72  |
| Yavlinsky       | 0.19 | 0.18  | 0.010  | 1.95 | 1.84 | 1.97  | -2.51  |
| Zhirinovskiy    | 0.30 | 0.30  | >0.005 | 1.53 | 1.38 | 1.38  | -18.42 |
| Chubais         | 0.18 | 0.09  | 0.090  | 0.02 | 0.02 | 1.91  | -1.79  |
| Luzhkov         | 0.14 | 0.14  | >0.005 | 2.02 | 1.95 | 2.13  | -4.15  |
| Bush Jr.        | 0.14 | 0.12  | 0.030  | 1.32 | 1.29 | 2.16  | -2.18  |
| Khakamada       | 0.25 | 0.25  | >0.005 | 2.12 | 1.90 | 1.90  | >0.005 |
| Putin           | 0.29 | 0.29  | >0.005 | 1.61 | 1.45 | 1.45  | >0.005 |
| Kasyanov        | 0.22 | 0.22  | >0.005 | 2.13 | 1.94 | 1.94  | >0.005 |
| Ryzhkov         | 0.21 | 0.21  | >0.005 | 2.02 | 1.87 | 1.88  | -28.67 |
| Berezovsky      | 0.20 | 0.20  | >0.005 | 2.09 | 1.94 | 1.94  | >0.005 |
| Shevardnadze    | 0.20 | 0.19  | 0.010  | 1.97 | 1.84 | 1.98  | -3.27  |
| Lukashenko      | 0.19 | 0.19  | >0.005 | 1.74 | 1.65 | 1.71  | -8.17  |
| Lebed           | 0.23 | 0.23  | >0.005 | 2    | 1.84 | 1.89  | -5.57  |
| Maskhadov       | 0.20 | 0.20  | >0.005 | 2.17 | 2.02 | 2.02  | -44.3  |
| Nemtsov         | 0.20 | 0.20  | >0.005 | 2.2  | 2.03 | 2.04  | -48.86 |
| Yasir Arafat    | 0.21 | 0.21  | >0.005 | 1.97 | 1.82 | 1.82  | >0.005 |
| Bin Laden       | 0.19 | 0.18  | 0.010  | 1.67 | 1.56 | 1.79  | -2.60  |

Notes:  $q$  is the probability of the given role-oriented interpretation;  $q^+$  is the probability of a direct interpretation;  $q^-$  is the probability of an opposite interpretation;  $b$  is the relative normalized rigidity of the given predisposition for perception of politicians;  $b^+$  and  $b^-$  represent the stability of the given predisposition among adherents of a positive and, respectively, negative version of the interpretation;  $M$  is the absolute rigidity of the state.

it no longer reflects anyone's view but is a nominal identifier of a certain mentality.

We now analyze the ideal relations between the roles of a politician that are in demand in various conditions. For this purpose, we calculate motivational vectors that define the direction that sets the maximum rating of a politician in specific conditions.

Table 5

**Categorical Interpretation of the Average Mental Predisposition of the Perception of Politicians**

| Politicians     | Categories |           |           |               |          |
|-----------------|------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|----------|
|                 | Trust      | Extremist | Communist | Crisis leader | Reformer |
| Peter the Great | 0.04       | 0.14      | 0.02      | 0.25          | 0.26     |
| Lenin           | -0.12      | 0.17      | 0.21      | 0.17          | 0.11     |
| Stalin          | 0.09       | 0.19      | 0.06      | 0.10          | 0.17     |
| Hitler          | 0          | 0.23      | 0.04      | 0.01          | 0.13     |
| Clinton         | -0.10      | -0.02     | -0.05     | 0.12          | 0.02     |
| Thatcher        | 0.14       | 0         | -0.06     | 0.20          | -0.01    |
| Gorbachev       | -0.16      | 0.08      | 0         | -0.01         | 0.01     |
| Yeltsin         | -0.16      | -0.13     | -0.04     | -0.11         | -0.07    |
| Zyuganov        | 0.01       | -0.14     | 0.1       | -0.12         | -0.23    |
| Yavlinsky       | 0          | -0.19     | -0.01     | -0.07         | -0.23    |
| Zhirinovskiy    | -0.32      | 0.07      | 0.05      | -0.12         | -0.15    |
| Chubais         | -0.01      | -0.07     | -0.08     | -0.05         | -0.10    |
| Luzhkov         | 0.08       | -0.1      | -0.11     | -0.07         | -0.09    |
| Bush Jr.        | 0.01       | -0.07     | -0.10     | -0.02         | -0.11    |
| Khakamada       | 0.15       | -0.2      | -0.15     | -0.11         | -0.22    |
| Putin           | 0.26       | 0         | -0.09     | 0.26          | 0.04     |
| Kasyanov        | 0.21       | -0.17     | -0.16     | -0.02         | -0.12    |
| Ryzhkov         | 0.06       | -0.21     | -0.11     | -0.08         | -0.16    |
| Berezovsky      | -0.13      | -0.02     | -0.19     | -0.03         | -0.04    |
| Shevardnadze    | 0.09       | -0.08     | -0.16     | -0.16         | -0.13    |
| Lukashenko      | 0.03       | -0.12     | -0.10     | -0.16         | -0.11    |
| Lebed           | 0.33       | -0.10     | -0.14     | -0.01         | -0.02    |
| Maskhadov       | 0.14       | 0         | -0.24     | -0.14         | -0.16    |
| Nemtsov         | 0.11       | -0.21     | -0.12     | -0.10         | -0.17    |
| Yasir Arafat    | 0.19       | 0.08      | -0.18     | -0.11         | -0.10    |
| Bin Laden       | 0.12       | 0.11      | -0.23     | -0.10         | -0.08    |

In a state of threat, what is most in demand is a *crisis leader* (0.88) invested with *trust* (0.45) (see Table 6).

The mentality assesses the current state as stable, which nonetheless requires a *crisis leader* who is *not an extremist*.

It turns out that the new generation has a poor understanding of how a *threat*

Table 6

## Characteristics of the Average Mental Predisposition of the Perception of Politicians

| Politicians     | $q$  | $q^+$ | $q^-$ | $M$  | $b$  | $b^+$ | $b^-$     |
|-----------------|------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|-----------|
| Peter the Great | 0.22 | 0.22  | 0     | 2.21 | 2.03 | 2.03  | 0         |
| Lenin           | 0.19 | 0.19  | 0     | 2.27 | 2.11 | 2.13  | -8.83     |
| Stalin          | 0.18 | 0.18  | 0     | 2.2  | 2.09 | 2.09  | -1,326.56 |
| Hitler          | 0.16 | 0.16  | 0.01  | 2.15 | 2.07 | 2.29  | -3.74     |
| Clinton         | 0.12 | 0.11  | 0.01  | 2.32 | 2.27 | 2.51  | -2.19     |
| Thatcher        | 0.14 | 0.14  | 0     | 2.37 | 2.27 | 2.28  | -20       |
| Gorbachev       | 0.14 | 0.13  | 0     | 2.05 | 2.00 | 2.26  | -5.34     |
| Yeltsin         | 0.14 | 0.14  | 0     | 2.29 | 2.20 | 2.28  | -10.53    |
| Zyuganov        | 0.17 | 0.17  | 0     | 2.36 | 2.22 | 2.23  | -36.79    |
| Yavlinsky       | 0.18 | 0.18  | 0     | 2.30 | 2.16 | 2.20  | -5.74     |
| Zhirinovskiy    | 0.26 | 0.26  | 0     | 1.95 | 1.76 | 1.76  | -63.66    |
| Chubais         | 0.13 | 0.12  | 0     | 2.16 | 2.11 | 2.26  | -6.52     |
| Luzhkov         | 0.13 | 0.13  | 0     | 2.35 | 2.27 | 2.32  | -10.61    |

|              |      |      |      |      |      |      |           |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----------|
| Bush Jr.     | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 2.13 | 2.09 | 2.37 | -3.98     |
| Khakamada    | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0    | 2.16 | 1.94 | 1.94 | 0         |
| Putin        | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0    | 1.93 | 1.75 | 1.75 | 0         |
| Kasyanov     | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0    | 2.23 | 2.04 | 2.04 | 0         |
| Ryzhkov      | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0    | 2.21 | 2.04 | 2.04 | -1,147.28 |
| Berezovsky   | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0    | 2.33 | 2.16 | 2.16 | 0         |
| Shevardnadze | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0    | 2.12 | 1.98 | 2.08 | -4.25     |
| Lukashenko   | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0    | 2.18 | 2.06 | 2.13 | -8.57     |
| Lebed        | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0    | 2.11 | 1.94 | 1.97 | -5.62     |
| Maskhadov    | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0    | 2.26 | 2.10 | 2.10 | 0         |
| Nemtsov      | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0    | 2.28 | 2.10 | 2.10 | 0         |
| Yasir Arafat | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0    | 2.29 | 2.12 | 2.12 | 0         |
| Bin Laden    | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0    | 2.40 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 0         |

Table 7

**Ideal Characteristics of a Politician in Demand in Various Conditions**

| Categories    | Threat condition | Stable conditions | Current conditions |
|---------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Trust         | 0.45             | 0.08              | 0.07               |
| Extremist     | -0.11            | -0.46             | -0.5               |
| Communist     | 0.08             | -0.10             | -0.09              |
| Crisis leader | 0.88             | 0.85              | 0.84               |
| Reformer      | -0.05            | -0.24             | -0.20              |

situation fundamentally differs from *stability* and in what situation they actually exist. Except perhaps that one would like to trust the ruler in a dangerous situation just a little bit more. As for peace, trust in the leader is not even at issue—as long as he is not an extremist. It is not hard to figure out the far-from-enthusiastic attitude of the mentality in question toward reforms by looking at the last line in Table 7.

The empirical “desirabilities” of politicians (we will call them ratings, although usually the latter are calculated according to ordinal scales and are much rougher) in various conditions are shown in Table 8. Unfortunately, the choice among currently active politicians for this mentality, as democratic as the electoral system is, is not large.

One can see what makes up the ratings of politicians in situations of threat and stability by looking at Figures 4 and 5.

The accuracies of forecasts made based on the modeling of the mental map for a stable situation are shown in Figure 6.

### **The semantic study of predispositions of the perception of the personality traits of a political image**

The second project examines the perception by young people’s mentality of the same group of politicians through the descriptors: “tough–mild,” “authoritative,” “one of us–alien,” “patriot,” “internationalist,” “intellectual,” “high-strung,” “moral,” “fair,” “decisive,” “experienced,” “fake–sincere,” “stupid–smart,” “aggressive,” “peaceful,” “capable of commanding,” “capable of following orders,” “creative,” “reliable,” and “risk taker.”

The average probabilities of states are shown in Figure 7. Comparing the curves in Figures 1 and 7, one can conclude that the stereotypes of role-oriented perceptions are less varied than personality-oriented ones.

However, the contribution to determining the average rating of a politician still comes primarily from the first state (see Figure 8 and Table 9). This means that that

Table 8


**Ratings of Politicians in Various Conditions**

| Politicians     | Threat condition | Stable conditions | Current conditions |
|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Peter the Great | <i>11.83</i>     | <i>7.18</i>       | <i>7.96</i>        |
| Lenin           | 3.56             | -1.45             | -1.32              |
| Stalin          | 3.99             | -7.02             | -7.35              |
| Hitler          | -1.5             | -12.16            | -13.22             |
| Clinton         | -1.13            | 2.13              | 3.10               |
| Thatcher        | <i>10.63</i>     | <i>12.65</i>      | <i>13.61</i>       |
| Gorbachev       | -8.86            | -6.50             | -5.63              |
| Yeltsin         | -12.32           | -8.40             | -7.92              |
| Zyuganov        | -8.51            | -7.06             | -6.83              |
| Yavlinsky       | -5.97            | 0.96              | 1.69               |
| Zhirinovskiy    | -17.16           | -16.24            | -17.34             |
| Chubais         | -6.37            | -4.38             | -4.10              |
| Luzhkov         | -5.22            | -4.41             | -4.03              |
| Bush Jr.        | -3.95            | -0.76             | -0.39              |
| Khakamada       | -6.52            | -2.32             | -1.67              |
| Putin           | <i>18.50</i>     | <i>20.40</i>      | <i>21.68</i>       |
| Kasyanov        | 0.33             | 3.72              | 4.78               |
| Ryzhkov         | -4.66            | 2.48              | 3.34               |
| Berezovsky      | -9.20            | -5.50             | -5.39              |
| Shevardnadze    | -9.15            | -9.91             | -10.26             |
| Lukashenko      | -9.12            | -7.78             | -7.75              |
| Lebed           | 4.38             | 1.60              | 2.29               |
| Maskhadov       | -8.82            | -11.60            | -12.42             |
| Nemtsov         | -2.92            | 3.77              | 4.38               |
| Yasir Arafat    | -3.76            | -9.86             | -11.10             |
| Bin Laden       | -4.92            | -9.77             | -11.13             |

the fairly common stereotypes of personality-oriented evaluations of politicians for the other states are, for the most part, compensated (compare Figure 2), although for a number of politicians there may be significant deviations (Gorbachev, Zyuganov, Luzhkov, Bush, Kasyanov).


Within the framework of this project, the following predispositional gestalts of perception stand out (see Table 10).

Figure 4. Contributions of Various Categories to Ratings. Threat Condition



[Labels in graph read as follows (left to right):]  
 Peter the Great, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Clinton, Thatcher, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, Zhirinovskiy, Chubais, Luzhkov, Bush Jr., Khakamada, Putin, Kasyanov, Ryzhkov, Berezovskiy, Shevardnadze, Lukashenko, Lebed, Maskhadov, Nemtsov, Yasir Arafat

Figure 5. Contributions of Various Categories to Ratings. Stability



[Labels in graph read as follows (left to right):] Peter the Great, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Clinton, Thatcher, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, Zhirinovskiy, Chubais, Luzhkov, Bush Jr., Khakamada, Putin, Kasyanov, Ryzhkov, Berezovsky, Shevardnadze, Lukashenko, Lebed, Maskhadov, Nemtsov, Yasir Arafat

Figure 6. Estimates of the Accuracy of the Prediction of Ratings. Situation of Stability





Figure 7. Average Probabilities of States




The first category (G1) forms a conception of a kindred, reliable partner whom one can trust, and includes the following descriptors: “reliable” (0.76), “one of us” (0.62), “smart” (0.56), “patriot” (0.46), and “moral” (0.43). It can be identified with the factor of *trust*.

The second category (G2) reflects an image of an experienced, dedicated leader-commander and is revealed through the descriptors: “experienced” (0.72), “capable of commanding” (0.70), “decisive” (0.67), “patriot” (0.67), “authoritative” (0.47), and “risk taker” (0.47).

The third category (G3) reflects “tyrannicalness–submissiveness”: “capable of following orders” (0.79), “tough–mild” (0.74), “aggressive–peaceful” (0.65), and

**Figure 8. Average Contributions of States to Determination of Objects of Study**



“authoritative” (−0.58). A link to the descriptor “nonintellectual–intellectual” (0.39) can also be found here in terms of a tendency.

The fourth category (G4) is defined as emotional “stability–instability” and unpredictability: “high-strung” (0.83), “risk taker” (0.58), “creative” (0.51), and “alien” (0.42).

The fifth category reveals a mental predisposition in the perception of intellectuality: “intellectual” (0.58), “indecisive” (0.45), “capable of following orders” (0.42), and “creative” (0.39). Politicians evidently must be extremely cautious in displaying intellectuality.

The sixth category (G6) is quite interesting, since it counterposes “sincerity” (0.87), “morality” (0.68), and “internationalism” (0.72) to “fakeness,” “immorality,” and “nationalism.” We should note that this category reveals the semantics of the image of a “nationalist” in this mentality.

Characteristics of politicians in terms of the defined categories within the framework of the first state is provided in Table 11.

The contributions of various categories of the first state to politicians’ ratings in situations of threat and stability is shown in Figures 9 and 10

The semantic nuances of the roles of politicians in young people’s mentality in the context of the first state may be analyzed by using a table of their correlations with personality traits (see Table 12). We should note that far from all semantic interpretations of political roles by young people are obvious and match their dictionary meanings (for example, the positive interpretation of the role “clever operator” in the political context is surprising).

Thus, this technology makes it possible to analyze the advantages and limitations of the image components of political ratings for a specific leader, to design a model of transforming a political image for various situations and to model a strategy for managing an image during an advertising campaign.

Table 9

## Contribution of Various Independent Interpretations (d) to Average Conception of a Politician In Young People's Mentality

| Politicians      | d1   | d2    | d3    | d4    | d5     | d6    | d7    | d8     | d9     | d10    |
|------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| Peter the Great  | 0.99 | 0.06  | 0     | -0.10 | -0.08  | 0.06  | 0.02  | 0.04   | -0.03  | -0.02  |
| <i>Lenin</i>     | 0.90 | 0.38  | -0.03 | -0.03 | >0.005 | 0.05  | 0.10  | 0.02   | 0.06   | 0.11   |
| Stalin           | 0.96 | 0.12  | -0.06 | 0.16  | 0.10   | 0.03  | 0.13  | >0.005 | -0.01  | 0.05   |
| Hitler           | 0.96 | -0.16 | 0.02  | -0.06 | 0.13   | 0.12  | -0.01 | 0.08   | -0.05  | -0.06  |
| Clinton          | 0.94 | 0.1   | -0.14 | 0.08  | 0.20   | -0.05 | -0.07 | 0.11   | 0.11   | 0.01   |
| Thatcher         | 0.96 | 0.15  | 0.19  | 0.02  | 0.05   | -0.11 | 0.10  | 0.01   | -0.01  | 0.005  |
| <i>Gorbachev</i> | 0.83 | 0.33  | 0.35  | -0.01 | 0.19   | 0.14  | -0.06 | 0.04   | -0.09  | 0.11   |
| <i>Yeltsin</i>   | 0.87 | 0.38  | -0.14 | 0     | 0.14   | -0.12 | 0.15  | -0.08  | -0.02  | -0.06  |
| <i>Zyuganov</i>  | 0.71 | 0.31  | -0.45 | 0.18  | 0.08   | -0.26 | -0.02 | -0.07  | -0.11  | 0.05   |
| Yavlinsky        | 0.87 | -0.03 | 0.18  | 0.29  | -0.22  | 0.09  | 0.01  | -0.17  | 0.07   | -0.07  |
| Zhirinovskiy     | 0.91 | -0.13 | -0.02 | -0.21 | 0.23   | 0.02  | 0.07  | 0.16   | >0.005 | 0.09   |
| <i>Chubais</i>   | 0.85 | 0.09  | -0.01 | -0.23 | 0.35   | -0.17 | 0.06  | 0.14   | -0.04  | >0.005 |
| <i>Luzhkov</i>   | 0.44 | 0.22  | 0.74  | -0.01 | 0.30   | -0.21 | -0.07 | -0.12  | 0.03   | -0.04  |

|                     |      |         |         |       |       |       |       |         |         |         |
|---------------------|------|---------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|---------|---------|
| <i>Bush Jr.</i>     | 0.56 | -0.02   | -0.14   | 0.53  | 0.13  | 0.38  | 0.03  | -0.09   | 0.27    | -0.27   |
| <i>Khakamada</i>    | 0.80 | 0.36    | 0.29    | -0.22 | 0.02  | 0.12  | 0.02  | 0.02    | 0.12    | -0.08   |
| <i>Putin</i>        | 0.97 | -0.03   | 0.11    | 0.11  | 0.01  | -0.10 | -0.06 | 0.06    | >0.0005 | -0.06   |
| <i>Kasyanov</i>     | 0.53 | 0.68    | -0.02   | -0.33 | 0.27  | 0.08  | -0.03 | -0.03   | 0.23    | 0.08    |
| <i>Ryzhkov</i>      | 0.97 | 0.07    | 0.04    | -0.01 | 0.15  | -0.02 | 0.05  | -0.02   | 0.09    | 0.02    |
| <i>Berezovsky</i>   | 0.97 | >0.0005 | 0.04    | 0.15  | 0.07  | 0.16  | 0.06  | >0.0005 | -0.05   | 0.03    |
| <i>Shevardnadze</i> | 0.91 | 0.31    | -0.08   | 0.10  | -0.14 | 0.02  | -0.14 | 0.05    | 0.03    | 0.08    |
| <i>Lukashenko</i>   | 0.94 | 0.21    | 0.21    | 0.03  | -0.07 | -0.02 | 0.07  | 0.05    | 0.02    | >0.0005 |
| <i>Lebed</i>        | 0.88 | 0.31    | 0.11    | -0.02 | 0.02  | 0.23  | 0.12  | -0.07   | 0.14    | -0.09   |
| <i>Maskhadov</i>    | 0.96 | 0       | -0.21   | -0.11 | -0.07 | 0.07  | -0.02 | 0.06    | -0.01   | 0.04    |
| <i>Nemtsov</i>      | 0.88 | 0.39    | -0.13   | 0.10  | -0.05 | -0.09 | -0.14 | 0.10    | -0.04   | 0.06    |
| <i>Yasir Arafat</i> | 0.95 | -0.10   | >0.0005 | -0.14 | 0.10  | -0.02 | 0.01  | -0.05   | -0.04   | 0.19    |
| <i>Bin Laden</i>    | 0.98 | -0.01   | 0.10    | -0.03 | 0.10  | 0.11  | 0.07  | 0.04    | 0.04    | -0.03   |

Note: Numbers in italics = statistically significant coefficient ( $p > 0.05$ ).

Table 10

**Categorical Predispositions of Young People's Mentality Regarding Personality Traits of Politicians**

| Traits           | Trust |              | Tyrannicalness-Submissiveness |       |       | Unpredictability |    | Intellectuality |    | Immorality |  |
|------------------|-------|--------------|-------------------------------|-------|-------|------------------|----|-----------------|----|------------|--|
|                  | G1    | Leader<br>G2 | G3                            | G4    | G5    | G6               | G5 | G6              | G5 | G6         |  |
| Tough-mild       | 0.06  | -0.04        | 0.74                          | -0.01 | 0.05  | -0.05            |    |                 |    |            |  |
| Authoritative    | 0.02  | 0.47         | -0.58                         | 0.24  | 0.25  | 0.21             |    |                 |    |            |  |
| One of us-alien  | -0.62 | 0.28         | 0.08                          | 0.42  | 0.11  | 0.08             |    |                 |    |            |  |
| Patriot          | 0.46  | 0.67         | 0.01                          | -0.27 | 0.24  | -0.06            |    |                 |    |            |  |
| Internationalist | -0.01 | 0            | 0.24                          | -0.03 | 0.18  | -0.72            |    |                 |    |            |  |
| Intellectual     | -0.08 | 0.34         | 0.39                          | -0.2  | 0.54  | -0.05            |    |                 |    |            |  |
| High-strung      | 0.06  | -0.04        | -0.08                         | 0.83  | -0.08 | 0.07             |    |                 |    |            |  |
| Moral            | 0.43  | 0.03         | 0.27                          | -0.11 | 0.09  | -0.68            |    |                 |    |            |  |
| Fair             | 0.25  | -0.06        | 0.11                          | -0.03 | 0.86  | -0.18            |    |                 |    |            |  |

|                             |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Decisive                    | 0.21  | 0.67  | -0.16 | 0.2   | -0.45 | 0.19  |
| Experienced                 | -0.24 | 0.72  | -0.01 | 0     | 0.03  | 0.06  |
| Fake-sincere                | 0.22  | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.06  | 0.04  | -0.87 |
| Stupid-smart                | 0.56  | 0.35  | 0.38  | 0.05  | -0.02 | -0.22 |
| Aggressive-peaceful         | 0.38  | -0.08 | 0.65  | 0.13  | 0.14  | -0.31 |
| Capable of commanding       | 0.10  | 0.70  | -0.15 | 0.34  | -0.02 | -0.30 |
| Capable of following orders | -0.13 | -0.12 | 0.79  | -0.12 | 0.42  | -0.17 |
| Creative                    | 0     | 0.20  | 0.36  | 0.51  | 0.39  | -0.04 |
| Reliable                    | 0.76  | 0.04  | 0.03  | 0.24  | 0.32  | -0.25 |
| Risk taker                  | -0.17 | 0.47  | -0.27 | 0.58  | -0.25 | -0.09 |
| Significance of category    | 2.10  | 2.74  | 2.62  | 1.89  | 1.92  | 2.45  |

Table 11


**Characteristics of the first mental predisposition of the perception of politicians**

| Traits          | Trust |       | Leader |       | Tyrannicalness-Submissiveness |       |       | Unpredictability |       | Intellectuality |       | Immorality |  |
|-----------------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------------------------------|-------|-------|------------------|-------|-----------------|-------|------------|--|
|                 | G1    | G2    | G2     | G3    | G3                            | G4    | G4    | G5               | G5    | G6              | G6    |            |  |
| Peter the Great | 0.43  | 0.84  | 0.84   | -0.15 | 0.04                          | 0.04  | 0.06  | 0.06             | 0.06  | -0.11           | -0.11 |            |  |
| Lenin           | 0.43  | 0.54  | 0.54   | 0.25  | 0.15                          | 0.15  | -0.1  | -0.1             | -0.05 | -0.05           | -0.05 |            |  |
| Stalin          | 0.2   | 0.63  | 0.63   | -0.18 | 0.34                          | 0.34  | -0.34 | -0.34            | 0.15  | 0.15            | 0.15  |            |  |
| Hitler          | -0.09 | 0.45  | 0.45   | -0.43 | 0.14                          | 0.14  | -0.25 | -0.25            | 0.28  | 0.28            | 0.28  |            |  |
| Clinton         | 0.11  | 0.49  | 0.49   | 0.43  | -0.23                         | -0.23 | 0.43  | 0.43             | -0.19 | -0.19           | -0.19 |            |  |
| Thatcher        | 0.14  | 0.78  | 0.78   | 0.1   | 0.01                          | 0.01  | 0.2   | 0.2              | -0.17 | -0.17           | -0.17 |            |  |
| Gorbachev       | -0.13 | -0.08 | -0.08  | 0.7   | -0.11                         | -0.11 | 0.19  | 0.19             | -0.13 | -0.13           | -0.13 |            |  |
| Yeltsin         | -0.26 | -0.42 | -0.42  | 0.46  | -0.26                         | -0.26 | 0.13  | 0.13             | 0.31  | 0.31            | 0.31  |            |  |
| Zyuganov        | -0.31 | -0.33 | -0.33  | 0.1   | -0.04                         | -0.04 | -0.09 | -0.09            | 0.17  | 0.17            | 0.17  |            |  |
| Yavlinsky       | -0.03 | 0.02  | 0.02   | 0.57  | -0.36                         | -0.36 | 0.34  | 0.34             | -0.24 | -0.24           | -0.24 |            |  |
| Zhirinovskiy    | 0.01  | -0.08 | -0.08  | -0.15 | 0.67                          | 0.67  | -0.17 | -0.17            | 0.34  | 0.34            | 0.34  |            |  |

|              |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Chubais      | -0.32 | 0.18  | 0.13  | 0.07  | -0.1  | 0.65  |
| Luzhkov      | -0.07 | 0.09  | 0.44  | 0.16  | 0.33  | -0.21 |
| Bush Jr.     | -0.57 | -0.1  | 0.15  | -0.17 | -0.18 | 0.61  |
| Khakamada    | -0.18 | -0.4  | 0.66  | -0.28 | 0.07  | 0.05  |
| Putin        | 0.55  | 0.52  | 0.2   | -0.29 | 0.19  | -0.25 |
| Kasyanov     | -0.03 | -0.49 | 0.27  | -0.49 | 0.19  | 0.29  |
| Ryzhkov      | -0.14 | -0.45 | 0.58  | -0.4  | 0.23  | 0.05  |
| Berezovsky   | -0.46 | -0.23 | 0.05  | -0.14 | -0.15 | 0.54  |
| Shevardnadze | -0.44 | -0.19 | 0     | -0.42 | -0.22 | 0.56  |
| Lukashenko   | -0.28 | -0.1  | 0.03  | -0.29 | -0.12 | 0.66  |
| Lebed        | 0.13  | 0.52  | -0.3  | -0.18 | -0.07 | -0.12 |
| Maskhadov    | -0.38 | -0.05 | -0.36 | -0.27 | -0.37 | 0.65  |
| Nemtsov      | -0.38 | -0.41 | 0.14  | -0.36 | -0.08 | 0.48  |
| Yasir Arafat | -0.41 | -0.1  | -0.43 | -0.3  | -0.28 | 0.48  |
| Bin Laden    | -0.28 | 0.18  | -0.45 | 0.08  | -0.49 | 0.40  |

Note: Numbers in italics = statistically significant coefficient ( $p > 0.05$ ).

Figure 9. Contributions of Various Categories to Ratings. Threat Condition



[Labels in graph read as follows (left to right):]

Peter the Great, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Clinton, Thatcher, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, Zhirinovsky, Chubais, Luzhkov, Bush Jr., Khakamada, Putin, Kasyanov, Ryzhkov, Beresovskiy, Shevardnadze, Lukashenko, Lebed, Maskhadov, Nemtsov, Yasir Arafat

[Labels in graph read as follows (left to right):]

Peter the Great, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Clinton, Thatcher, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, Zhirinovskiy, Chubais, Luzhkov, Bush Jr., Khakamada, Putin, Kasyanov, Ryzhkov, Berezovsky, Shevardnadze, Lukashenko, Lebed, Maskhadov, Nemtsov, Yasir Arafat

Figure 10. Contributions of Various Categories to Ratings. Stable Conditions




Table 12

## Correlation Matrix of Roles and Personality Traits in a Group of Politicians

| Traits                  | Hero  | Demagogue | Diplomat | Clown | Clever operator | Actor | Reformer | Extremist | Gambler | Orator | Scammer | Communist | Fanatic | Boss  | Tsar  | Expert | Fighter |
|-------------------------|-------|-----------|----------|-------|-----------------|-------|----------|-----------|---------|--------|---------|-----------|---------|-------|-------|--------|---------|
| Tough-mild              | 0.03  | 0.31      | 0.03     | 0.24  | -0.05           | -0.11 | -0.30    | -0.52     | -0.28   | -0.07  | 0.19    | 0.04      | 0.52    | -0.41 | -0.25 | -0.63  | -0.48   |
| Authoritative           | 0.36  | -0.39     | 0.20     | -0.13 | 0.24            | 0.07  | 0.51     | 0.53      | 0.44    | 0.16   | -0.15   | 0.24      | 0.60    | 0.80  | 0.53  | 0.35   | 0.72    |
| One of us- <i>alien</i> | -0.14 | 0.07      | -0.15    | 0.23  | 0.04            | 0.27  | 0.19     | 0.47      | 0.50    | 0.15   | 0.36    | 0.06      | 0.42    | 0.10  | 0.13  | 0.35   | 0.19    |
| Patriot                 | 0.55  | 0.01      | 0.56     | -0.10 | 0.33            | 0.01  | 0.49     | 0.32      | 0.25    | 0.39   | 0.10    | 0.40      | 0.45    | 0.39  | 0.49  | 0.42   | 0.42    |
| Internationalist        | 0.06  | 0.16      | 0.16     | 0.14  | 0.18            | 0.07  | 0.01     | -0.42     | -0.08   | 0.15   | 0.08    | 0.37      | -0.01   | 0.10  | -0.02 | -0.32  | 0.10    |
| Intellectual            | 0.14  | 0.38      | 0.46     | -0.02 | 0.08            | 0.11  | -0.10    | -0.23     | -0.12   | 0.08   | 0.19    | 0.11      | -0.18   | -0.15 | 0.03  | 0.06   | -0.13   |
| High-strung             | 0.14  | 0.18      | -0.13    | 0.62  | 0.02            | 0.50  | 0.04     | 0.19      | 0.32    | 0.13   | 0.02    | 0.37      | 0.31    | 0.22  | 0.06  | 0.02   | 0.23    |
| Moral                   | 0.21  | 0.21      | 0.55     | -0.16 | 0.37            | 0.17  | 0.05     | -0.23     | -0.18   | 0.25   | 0.00    | 0.16      | 0.00    | 0.02  | 0.26  | 0.39   | 0.01    |
| Fair                    | 0.39  | 0.24      | 0.62     | -0.04 | 0.25            | 0.20  | 0.16     | -0.19     | -0.13   | 0.30   | 0.09    | 0.23      | -0.14   | 0.00  | 0.40  | 0.12   | -0.01   |
| Decisive                | 0.54  | -0.08     | 0.19     | 0.09  | 0.40            | 0.19  | 0.77     | 0.71      | 0.53    | 0.51   | -0.04   | 0.39      | 0.77    | 0.77  | 0.58  | 0.56   | 0.80    |

|                             |       |       |      |       |       |       |       |       |       |      |       |      |       |       |       |       |       |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Experienced                 | 0.49  | -0.13 | 0.57 | -0.23 | 0.19  | 0.03  | 0.50  | 0.57  | 0.36  | 0.24 | -0.09 | 0.18 | 0.42  | 0.71  | 0.57  | 0.45  | 0.63  |
| Fake-sincere                | 0.72  | 0.14  | 0.42 | -0.14 | 0.49  | 0.03  | 0.50  | 0.37  | 0.18  | 0.49 | -0.01 | 0.35 | 0.46  | 0.42  | 0.37  | 0.47  | 0.56  |
| Stupid-smart                | 0.51  | -0.03 | 0.53 | -0.21 | 0.30  | 0.24  | 0.68  | 0.50  | 0.41  | 0.64 | -0.06 | 0.37 | 0.53  | 0.59  | 0.55  | 0.47  | 0.66  |
| Aggressive-peaceful         | 0.19  | 0.55  | 0.48 | 0.30  | 0.12  | 0.32  | 0.00  | -0.38 | -0.15 | 0.18 | 0.27  | 0.45 | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.07  | -0.07 | -0.24 |
| Capable of commanding       | 0.52  | -0.30 | 0.26 | -0.16 | 0.18  | -0.09 | 0.51  | 0.40  | 0.16  | 0.30 | -0.21 | 0.21 | 0.39  | 0.56  | 0.44  | 0.36  | 0.64  |
| Capable of following orders | -0.10 | 0.60  | 0.03 | 0.31  | -0.02 | 0.24  | -0.16 | -0.48 | -0.30 | 0.14 | 0.24  | 0.26 | -0.30 | -0.36 | -0.16 | -0.25 | -0.38 |
| Creative                    | 0.18  | 0.11  | 0.24 | 0.25  | 0.38  | 0.32  | 0.28  | -0.19 | 0.23  | 0.32 | 0.12  | 0.34 | 0.13  | 0.17  | 0.21  | 0.00  | 0.16  |
| Reliable                    | 0.62  | 0.09  | 0.52 | -0.09 | 0.37  | 0.04  | 0.58  | 0.30  | 0.09  | 0.55 | 0.08  | 0.46 | 0.49  | 0.54  | 0.51  | 0.39  | 0.65  |
| Risk taker                  | 0.32  | -0.07 | 0.07 | 0.05  | 0.19  | 0.22  | 0.55  | 0.41  | 0.67  | 0.29 | 0.04  | 0.30 | 0.59  | 0.52  | 0.41  | 0.25  | 0.64  |

Note: Correlation coefficients where  $R > 0.95$  are in italics.

## Notes

1. Winner of the Golden Psyche 2003 competition in the category “Best Project of the Year in Psychology.”

2. With the support of the Russian Human Sciences Foundation (RHSF), Project no. 7.00-06-00199a.

3. Based on material from regional research in the spring of 2002.

4. In addition to active politicians, the list of objects of the study includes politicians of the past and individuals who have left the political stage but consistently performed at the level of stereotypes. In defense of including such politicians in the study, we can say the following: they can provide additional characteristics of the kind of leader most in demand in the present and set some starting points for tracking changes in the images of today’s leaders.